

# Game Theory & Learning: LECTURE 8

## Adaptive and Sophisticated Learning (CONT'D)

**Definition** A strategy  $x_n \in S_n$  is  $\epsilon$ -dominated by another strategy  $\bar{x}_n \in \Delta(S_n)$  if

$$\forall z_{-n} \in S_{-n} \quad \pi_n(x_n, z_{-n}) + \epsilon < \pi_n(\bar{x}_n, z_{-n}).$$

If  $\forall \epsilon$   $x_n$  is  $\epsilon$ -dominated by  $\bar{x}_n$ , then  $x_n$  is dominated by  $\bar{x}_n$  (in the classical sense).

Let  $T \subseteq S$ . Define  $T_n \equiv T|_{S_n}$  = projection of  $T$  onto  $S_n$ .  
 $T_{-n} = \times_{j \neq n} T_j$ .

**Definition** Given  $T \subseteq S$ . Let

$$\begin{aligned} U_n^\epsilon(T) &= \{x_n \in S_n : \forall y_n \in \Delta(S_n) \exists z_{-n} \in T_{-n} \\ &\quad \pi_n(x_n, z_{-n}) + \epsilon \geq \pi_n(y_n, z_{-n})\} \\ U^\epsilon(T) &= \times_{n \in N} U_n^\epsilon(T). \end{aligned}$$

$U_n^\epsilon(T)$  = Pure strategies in  $S_n$  that are not  $\epsilon$ -dominated when  $n$ 's rivals are limited to  $T_{-n}$ .

### Fact 1

The operator  $U^\epsilon$  is monotonic. Let  $R$  and  $T$  be sets of strategy profiles.

$$R \subseteq T \Rightarrow U^\epsilon(R) \subseteq U^\epsilon(T).$$

### Fact 2

$$\exists_T U^\epsilon(T) \not\subseteq T.$$

In general, starting with some arbitrary set of strategy profile  $T$  one may not be able to create a monotonically descending chain of sets of strategy profiles:

$$T \supseteq U^\epsilon(T) \supseteq U^{\epsilon,2}(T) \supseteq \dots \supseteq U^{\epsilon,k}(T) \supseteq U^{\epsilon,k+1}(T) \supseteq \dots$$

### Fact 3

However,  $S \supseteq U^\epsilon(S)$ . Since  $S$  is the whole nothing new can get introduced.

By the monotonicity of  $U^\epsilon$ , we see that if

$$U^{\epsilon,k}(T) \supseteq U^{\epsilon,k+1}(T),$$

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then

$$U^\epsilon(U^{\epsilon,k}(T)) \supseteq U^\epsilon(U^{\epsilon,k+1}(T))$$

and

$$U^{\epsilon,k+1}(T) \supseteq U^{\epsilon,k+2}(T).$$

Putting it all together, we *do* have

$$S \supseteq U^\epsilon(S) \supseteq U^{\epsilon,2}(S) \supseteq \dots \supseteq U^{\epsilon,k}(S) \supseteq U^{\epsilon,k+1}(S) \supseteq \dots$$

We then define

$$U^{\epsilon\infty}(S) = \bigcap_{k=0}^{\infty} U^{\epsilon,k}(S).$$

Hence,  $U^{0\infty}(S) = \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} U^{\epsilon,\infty}(S) =$  Serially undominated strategy set. We say  $x$  is serially undominated, if  $x \in U^{0\infty}(S)$ .

**Definition** *A sequence of strategies  $\{x_n(t)\}$  is consistent with adaptive learning by player  $n$  if*

$$\forall \epsilon > 0 \forall \hat{t} \exists \bar{t} \forall t \geq \bar{t} x_n(t) \in U_n^\epsilon \left( \{x(s) : \hat{t} \leq s < t\} \right).$$

*A sequence of strategy profiles  $\{x(t)\}$  is consistent with adaptive learning if each  $\{x_n(t)\}$  has this property.*

## Looking Forward

$$F^{\epsilon,0}(\hat{t}, t) = U^\epsilon \left( \{x(s) : \hat{t} \leq s < t\} \right).$$

$\forall k \geq 1:$

$$F^{\epsilon,k}(\hat{t}, t) = U^\epsilon \left( F^{\epsilon,k-1}(\hat{t}, t) \cup \{x(s) : \hat{t} \leq s < t\} \right).$$

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## Lemma

$$F^{\epsilon,0}(\hat{t}, t) \subseteq F^{\epsilon,1}(\hat{t}, t) \subseteq \dots \subseteq F^{\epsilon,k}(\hat{t}, t) \subseteq F^{\epsilon,k+1}(\hat{t}, t) \subseteq \dots$$

Proof

By the monotonicity of  $U^\epsilon$ ,

$$F^{\epsilon,0}(\hat{t}, t) \subseteq F^{\epsilon,1}(\hat{t}, t).$$

Assume by inductive hypothesis,

$$F^{\epsilon,k-1}(\hat{t}, t) \subseteq F^{\epsilon,k}(\hat{t}, t).$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned} & F^{\epsilon,k-1}(\hat{t}, t) \cup \{x(s) : \hat{t} \leq s < t\} \\ & \subseteq F^{\epsilon,k}(\hat{t}, t) \cup \{x(s) : \hat{t} \leq s < t\}. \end{aligned}$$

By the monotonicity of  $U^\epsilon$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} & U^\epsilon \left( F^{\epsilon,k-1}(\hat{t}, t) \cup \{x(s) : \hat{t} \leq s < t\} \right) \\ & \subseteq U^\epsilon \left( F^{\epsilon,k}(\hat{t}, t) \cup \{x(s) : \hat{t} \leq s < t\} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Thus

$$F^{\epsilon,k}(\hat{t}, t) \subseteq F^{\epsilon,k+1}(\hat{t}, t).$$

**Definition** *A sequence of strategies  $\{x_n(t)\}$  is consistent with sophisticated learning by player  $n$  if*

$$\forall \epsilon > 0 \forall \hat{t} \exists \bar{t} \forall t \geq \bar{t} x_n(t) \in U_n^\epsilon(F^{\epsilon\infty}(\hat{t}, t)).$$

*A sequence of strategy profiles  $\{x(t)\}$  is consistent with sophisticated learning if each  $\{x_n(t)\}$  has this property.*

$$\forall \epsilon > 0 \forall \hat{t} \exists \bar{t} \forall t \geq \bar{t} x(t) \in F^{\epsilon\infty}(\hat{t}, t).$$