

# Game Theory & Learning: LECTURE 10 (CONT'D)

**Theorem**      *Suppose*  $U^{0\infty}(S) = \{\bar{x}\}$ .

$$\|x(t) - \bar{x}\| \rightarrow 0$$

*iff*  $x(t)$  is consistent with sophisticated learning.

## Stochastic Learning Processes

We now allow the players to experiment as we will now assume that each user may not know his own pay-off function. See Freudenberg & Kreps (1988).

*Game* consists of alternations among

- *Exploration*: Every strategy is experimented with equi-probability.
- *Exploitation*: Good strategies —based on exploration— are played.

At each date  $t$ , player  $n$  conducts an experiment with probability  $\epsilon_{nt}$  in an attempt to learn its best play.

1. **Independence**: Decision to experiment is independent of other players' decisions.
2. **Rare**:  $\epsilon_{nt} \rightarrow 0$  as  $t \rightarrow \infty$ .
3. **Infinitely Often**:  $\sum_t \epsilon_{nt} = \infty$ .

$\{t(k, \omega)\}$  = Subsequence of dates at which player  $n$  conducts no experiment.

$\omega$  = Realization of the players' randomized choices.

Thus the interval  $[0, t]$  consists of experiment dates  $P_n(x_n, t)$  and play dates  $M_n(x_n, t)$ . Write  $M(t)$  to denote the expected total number of experiments.

- $\Pi(x_n, t)$  = Total Pay off received with  $M_n(x_n, t)$
- $\Pi(y_n, t)$  = Total Pay off received with  $M_n(y_n, t)$

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Claim:

Let  $T =$  set of strategy profiles.

$$\forall z \in T \pi_n(x_n, z_{-n}) < \pi_n(y_n, z_{-n}) - 2\epsilon$$

$\Rightarrow$  For large  $t$

$$\Pi(x_n, t) < \Pi(y_n, t) - \epsilon M(t)/|S_n|.$$

$$\begin{aligned} & E[\Pi(x_n, \tau + 1) - \Pi(y_n, \tau + 1)|T] - \Pi(x_n, \tau) + \Pi(y_n, \tau) \\ &= \epsilon_{n, \tau+1}/|S_n| E[\pi_n(x_n, x_{-n}(\tau + 1)) - \pi_n(y_n, x_{-n}(\tau + 1))] \\ &< -2\epsilon \cdot \epsilon_{n, \tau+1}/|S_n|. \end{aligned}$$

Taking expectations

$$\begin{aligned} & E[\Pi(x_n, \tau + 1) - \Pi(y_n, \tau + 1)|T] \\ &= E[\Pi(x_n, \tau) - \Pi(y_n, \tau)|T] - 2\epsilon \cdot \epsilon_{n, \tau+1}/|S_n|. \end{aligned}$$

and then telescoping,

$$E[\Pi(x_n, t) - \Pi(y_n, t)] < -2\epsilon/|S_n| \sum \epsilon_{n, t} = -2\epsilon M(t)/|S_n|.$$

Let  $\Delta > 2|\pi_n|$ .

$$\text{Var}[\Pi(x_n, t) - \Pi(y_n, t)] \leq -2\Delta^2\epsilon M(t)/|S_n|.$$

Thus  $\Pi(x_n, t) - \Pi(y_n, t) + \epsilon M(t)/|S_n|$  converges to  $-\infty$  and hence represents a super-martingale.

In other words,  $x_n$  dominates  $y_n$  then the player  $n$  will discover this fact eventually by repeated experiments.

**Theorem** *For any finite strategy game  $\Gamma$ , the sequence  $\{x_n(t(k, \omega))\}$  constructed as described above is consistent with adaptive learning a.s. (almost surely).*