

Public Policy Management: W12. Public Policy Implementation

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Week	Main Topics	Key words
10	How Policy Makes Politics	nexus of policy and politics
11	Evidence-Based Policymaking	Evidence, research
12	Policy implementation	bureaucracy, Government officials
13	Evaluation of public policy	Goals, attainment
14	Public Policy Analysis	policy content analysis
15	Public Policy Analysis: Stakeholder Analysis	who, what and how
16	Public Policy Analysis: Cost- Benefit Analysis	costs, benefits, returns

Recap previous weeks

- How Policy Makes Politics
- Evidence-Based Policymaking
- **Outline of Week12:**
 - In 3 parts:
 - Part I
 - Why study PP implementation ?
 - Process of “translating policy into action”
 - Approaches to Public Policy Implementation
 - Implementation Challenges
 - How to tackle the Implementation challenges

Outline of Week12: Policy Implementation

- Part II: country case study – Papua New Guinea
- Public Sector Reforms in PNG
- Post 2001 reforms: over view
- Part III: How to tackle the Implementation Challenges?
- A Policy-Implementation Dichotomy?
- How to fix slippages?

What is Implementation ?

- Implementation studies are to be found at the intersection of public administration, organizational theory, public management research, and political science studies (Schofield and Sausman 2004).
- In the broadest sense, they can be characterized as studies of policy change (Jenkins 1978).
- Until the end of the 1960s, it had been taken for granted that political mandates were clear, and administrators were thought to implement policies according to the intentions of decision makers (Hill and Hupe 2002).

Why study implementation?

- The process of “translating policy into action” (Barrett 2004, 251) attracted more attention, as policies seemed to lag behind policy expectations.
- **Policies fail, or appear to fail.**
- The first generation of implementation studies, which dominated much of the 1970s, was characterized by a pessimistic undertone. This pessimism was fueled by a number of case studies that represented shining examples of implementation failure.
- We can presumably learn how to make policies more successful by studying implementation
 - Policies can be redesigned
 - But policies are always being redesigned anyway, so how do we study implementation?

Why study implementation?

- Can implementation be separated from policy making?
- While theory building was not at the heart of the first generation of implementation studies, the second generation began to put forward a whole range of theoretical frameworks and hypotheses.
- This period was marked by debates between what was later dubbed the top-down and bottom-up approaches to implementation research.

Public Policy Implementation

- Involve all activities designed to carry out the policies enacted
- These activities may include creation of new organizations, departments agencies, & bureaus or assignments of new responsibilities to existing organizations
- Elements of PPI includes: Interpretation and Application
- Coordination of resources to achieve intended goals

Approaches to Public Policy Implementation

1. Top-down models put their main emphasis on the ability of decision makers' to produce unequivocal policy objectives and on controlling the implementation stage.
2. Bottom-up critiques view local bureaucrats as the main actors in policy delivery and conceive of implementation as negotiation processes within networks of implementers.
3. Hybrid theories try to overcome the divide between the other two approaches by incorporating elements of top-down, bottom-up and other theoretical models

- **Top to Bottom Approach**
- **Bottom up Approach**
- **Third Generational Models**

Top to Bottom Approach

- Assume that policy imple. starts with a decision made by central govt. Parsons (1995) points out that these studies were based on a “black box model” of the policy process inspired by systems analysis.
- Hierarchical execution of centrally-defined policy intentions are **bureaucratic**. Adapts perspective of higher level officials; and **unidirectional** (Sabatier, 1986).
- The establishment of the capacity of the implementation process to be consistent with causal theory, coupled with **policy objectives, aims, and goals**, is essential for a successful top-down process of policy implementation.
- However, it does not provide room for information flow **through feedback channels**.

Top-down approach assumptions:

- Policies contain clearly defined goals against which performance can be measured.
- Policies contain clearly defined policy tools.
- Policy characterized by a single statute or other authoritative statement of policy.
- There is an 'implementation chain' that 'starts with a policy message at the top and sees implementation as occurring in a chain.
- Policy designers have a good knowledge of the capacity and commitment of the implementers.
- Implementation as an "interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve them".
- Policy implementations are of a multi-actor type.

Criteria for effective implementation

- Assumed a clear separation of policy formation from policy implementation; lists six criteria for effective implementation:
 - 1) policy objectives are clear and consistent,
 - 2) the program is based on a valid causal theory,
 - 3) the implementation process is structured adequately,
 - 4) implementing officials are committed to the program's goals,
 - 5) interest groups and (executive and legislative) sovereigns are supportive, &
 - 6) there are no detrimental changes in the socioeconomic framework conditions.

Success of the top-down process

- It is a function of the capacity of the legal frameworks and the enforcing agencies to force or compel groups of people targeted by the policy to abide by the policy guidelines. In the implementation of any policy, one determinant of success is **how skilled** the people charged with the implementation are (Matland, 1995).
- It is also dependent on **socio-economic factors**. These SES have a role to play in policy implementation, as they constitute one of the measures used to assess the success of implementation.
- It requires **political willingness as well as political support**. May and Wintner (2009) maintain that the approach demands that the eventual success of the policy implemented should be measured by how well it is able to solve the problems that it was initially meant to offer solutions to.

Top-down approach: Challenges

- The process divides into **two main segments**; (i) the 'top', takes the role of the development of the policy. (ii) The 'bottom' constitutes the public-policy implementation agents. This segmentation ensures the flow of voice of command from the uppermost level to the lowest level in a single direction so that bureaucracy is enhanced during the implementation process.
- A major challenge of using this approach is when all issues affecting groups targeted by a given policy must be fully addressed in the implementation of that policy. However, it fails to come out with an **appropriate process for public-policy implementation**.
- Bureaucrats constitute important agents for public policy implementation, although they are ignored by those who are charged with the role of implementing the top-down approach. **Abiding by policy guidelines should not be a choice. Rather, it is mandatory.**

Emergence of Bottom-up approach

- During 1970s and 1980s, bottom-up theories emerged as a critical response to top-down school.
- Studies showed that political outcomes did not always sufficiently relate to original policy objectives and the assumed causal link was questionable. Theorists suggested studying what was actually happening on the ground and analyzing the real causes influence action on the ground.
- Studies of this type started from the “bottom” by identifying the networks of actors involved in actual policy delivery. So, they rejected the idea that policies are defined at the central level and that implementers need to stick to these objectives.
- Instead, the availability of discretion at the stage of policy delivery appeared as a beneficial factor as local bureaucrats were seen to be much nearer to the real problems than central policy makers.

Bottom-up approach

- As opposed to the top-down approach, the bottom-up approach integrates the groups of people targeted by a public policy into the implementation process.
- Sabatier (1986) notes that this step is initiated by “identifying the network of actors involved in service delivery in one or more local areas and asking them about their goals, strategies, activities, and contacts”.
- The acquired contacts are then utilised in the development of myriads of networks with an objective of increasing the number of local, national, and regional actors who would play the roles of financing, planning and executing the policy.
- In the bottom-up approach, ‘top’ as well as ‘bottom’ actors in the process of creating public policies collaborate and exchange information about policy formulation and implementation via a dynamic process.

Bottom-up approach

- It maintains that the phases of policy implementation and formulation are inseparable (Matland, 1995). According to Pastine and Pastine (2010), the approach views politicians and administrators as playing critical roles in the successful process of policy formulation followed by its implementation.
- The people whose problems a public policy seeks to solve form the bottom level. The need for a public policy emerges from the bottom. The response to these needs, however, is a responsibility of those at the 'top'. Sabatier (1986) criticises this direction of information flow is **unidirectional** because policy-making initiates from the 'bottom' and moves towards the 'top'.
- Recognizes the multi-actor and inter-organizational character of policy delivery. Therefore, they suggested that implementation analysis should start with the identification of networks of actors from all relevant agencies collaborating in implementation and then examine the way they try to solve their problem.

Bottom-Up

- The successful implementation of public policies requires the integration of the person affected by the policy in the planning, formulation, and implementation phases of the policy (Cope & Goodship, 1999).
- Bottom-up makes sense when there is no one dominant program and when one is more interested in the local dynamics of implementation than in the broad sweep design.
- Although they are normally regarded as low-level employees, the **actions of most public service workers actually constitute the services ‘delivered’ by government.** Behavior of public service workers (e.g., teachers, social workers, police officers, doctors), which is called “street-level bureaucrats.”
- When taken together the individual decisions of these workers become, or add up to, **agency policy.**

Comparative discussion

- There are several characteristics of top-down and bottom-up theories that account for the wide gulf that separates these two schools of thought in implementation theory:
- They are marked by:
 - competing research strategies,
 - contrasting goals of analysis,
 - opposing models of the policy process,
 - inconsistent understandings of the implementation process, and
 - conflicting models of democracy

Top-down and Bottom-up Theories Compared

	Top-down theories	Bottom-up theories
Research strategy	Top-down: from political decisions to administrative execution	Bottom-up: from individual bureaucrats to administrative networks
Goal of analysis	Prediction/policy recommendation	Description/explanation
Model of policy process	Stagist	Fusionist
Character of implementation process	Hierarchical guidance	Decentralized problem-solving
Underlying model of democracy	Elitist	Participatory

Comparative discussion: way forward

- As Sabatier (1986) rightly notes, top-downers overemphasized the ability of central policy makers to issue unequivocal policy objectives and to meticulously control the process of implementation.
- In criticizing this “law-makers’ perspective,” bottom-uppers at the same time overestimated the amount of discretion of local bureaucrats and thus overemphasized the autonomy of the “bottom” vis-à-vis the “top.”
- As scholars gathered more and more empirical evidence that demonstrated the relevance of both approaches, it would have been easy to agree on mutually acceptable theoretical models of implementation that pay attention to both central steering and local autonomy.
- This is the path followed by some of the “hybrid theories”.

Third Generation Models: Combination of both

- Recognizes both top-down and bottom up elements.
- Considering both approaches are unidirectional, the best approach is the one that encourages constant interaction between the 'top' and the 'bottom' actors in formulating and implementing public policy via forward and backward information-flow loops.
- Such an approach can aid in capturing various intricacies that impede successful policy implementation (Whitford, 2007).
- Efforts to ensure the identification of pitfalls to successful policy implementation highlight the need to evaluate public policy at the formulation and the implementation phases (Barzelay & Jacobsen, 2009).

Third Generation Models:

- Taking the top-downers' concern with effective policy execution as their starting point, they blended several elements of the bottom-up perspective and of other theories into their models. This is why we discuss this group of scholars under the heading of "hybrid theories."
- Lay much emphasis on specifying clear hypotheses, finding proper operationalizations and producing adequate empirical observations to test these hypotheses.
- The goal of third-generation research was "to be more scientific than the previous two in its approach to the study of implementation" (Goggin et al. 1990).
- Third-generation scholars thus lay much emphasis on specifying clear hypotheses finding proper operationalizations and producing adequate empirical observations to test these hypotheses.

Third Generation Models:

- Policy makers should therefore start with the consideration of policy instruments and available resources for policy change (forward mapping). In addition, they should identify the incentive structure of implementers and target groups (backward mapping).
- Like top-downers, they continued to accept the perspective of a centrally defined policy decision to be implemented by lower-level actors.
- Their goal of developing a general theory of implementation on the basis of rigorous methods also owes much to the top-down perspective.
- However, their conception of the implementation process embraced the fact that implementers are political actors in their own right and that the outcome of this endeavor entailed complicated negotiation processes between implementers and central authorities.

Third Generation Models:

- In sum, the approaches we summarized under the heading of “hybrid theories” brought two important innovations to implementation theory.
- First, they tried to overcome the conceptual weaknesses of the polarized debate between bottom-up and top-down scholars.
- Leaving aside the normative aspects of the controversy, they focused instead on empirical arguments about the proper conceptualization of the implementation processes and pragmatically blended the extreme arguments of both sides into models that embraced both central steering and local autonomy.
- Second, some of the hybrid theorists pointed to important factors that had hitherto received little attention.

Driving forces behind implementation

- 1. Both sides seem to agree that implementation is a continuum located between central guidance and local autonomy. The preferences of street-level bureaucrats and the negotiations within implementation networks have to be taken into account to the same extent as centrally defined policy objectives and efforts at hierarchical control. The actual position of individual *implementation processes on this continuum is an empirical rather* than a theoretical question.
- 2. Bottom-uppers - implementation is more than the technical execution of political orders from above. It is itself a political process in the course of which policies are frequently reshaped, redefined or even completely overturned.

Driving forces behind implementation

- 3. More and more accepted among the proponents of “hybrid” or “synthesizing” theories: implementation and policy formulation are highly interdependent processes. If not abandoning the “stagist” model of the policy process altogether, it now seems to be widely accepted to take into consideration the impact of policy formulation on implementation.
- 4. Especially the work of Sabatier has alerted us to the fact that implementation processes (and processes of policy change more generally) should not be viewed in isolation. Instead, **exogenous influences from other policy fields or external economic developments need to be taken into account.**

Driving forces behind implementation

- 5. Recent EU implementation analysis has highlighted that different countries seem to have different “implementation styles.”
- To learn more about the contrasting logics of implementation in different country settings, more research with an explicit focus on cross-country comparison (national, regional and local studies) is needed.
- Moreover, it demonstrated that rather than searching for a unique “implementation theory”, theoretical arguments from comparative politics, insights from historical institutionalisms, can shed new light on implementation processes.

Part II: Implementation Challenges

- **Probable Conditions for successful Implementation**
 - Contains Unambiguous directives and structures
 - Leaders possess substantial managerial and political skills and professional knowledge
 - Supported by organized constituency groups, legislatures and judiciary
 - Relative priority of statutory objectives is not undermined

Public Sector Reforms in PNG

- Public sector reform in Papua New Guinea can be regarded as a case of poor policy practice. There has been no shortage of policy making. Many initiatives can be identified. Where the policies have come to grief has been in implementation. From a technical point of view we can identify a familiar list of problems.
- There has been little attention to policy analysis, specifically an anticipation of where policies could go wrong. For example, policies are announced when the capacity to implement them is obviously lacking or the financial ramifications are not worked through.
- Other technical deficiencies include poor definition of processes and responsibilities; inadequate supervision; lack of trained staff; slowness of bureaucratic action; constant turnover of managers; insufficient coordination; and infrastructure shortcomings.

Public Sector Reforms in PNG

- While the technical explanations of policy failure have validity in delineating what the public sector lacks, it is in the political dimension of reform that we find the important root causes.
- As Caiden (1969) advised, public sector reform is 'transformation against resistance'. In Papua New Guinea the capacity to resist has been extremely strong. Sometimes it may be better described as the capacity to ignore, the exercise of power by doing nothing (Lukes 1974).
- The technical shortcomings occur because there is no concerted effort by the political elite to ensure that implementation of public sector reform conforms to the policy plans.
- Despite the numerous consultants' reports and grand statements by prime ministers, there appears to have been remarkably little interest in following through on public sector reform. Leading officials have not monitored reforms, demanded regular updating, enforced accountability and supervised reform initiatives.

Public Sector Reforms in PNG

- There are several reasons for this. In part it stems from the nature of Papua New Guinea politics, in which particularistic concerns of staying in office and of satisfying small groups of supporters have dominated political life. Parties do not have platforms or policies.
- Thus, Prime Minister Morauta's attempts to engage in political engineering may have a more profound effect on public sector performance than repeated institutional strengthening programs.
- Secondly, crisis government is typical, and in such circumstances long-term public sector reform is simply not a priority. It is rather dull and does not attract votes.
- It thus becomes unattractive to own public sector reform. Ownership is sometimes forced upon unwilling political leadership by multilateral financial agencies, but in such circumstances, domestic commitment may be limited.

Public Sector Reforms in PNG

- The third political aspect of public sector reform relates to control of public resources, the public service, and appointments in it.
- It is significant that the public service reforms that have been pushed through parliament have been of domestic origin and concerned with enhancing the power of the national political elite.
- They have secured control of appointments and subnational government while simultaneously allowing accountability to go into decline. When looked at from this viewpoint, public sector reform which produces good governance is actually a major threat to the political elite.
- While the system does not work for the majority of Papua New Guineans it may well work for many in the political elite.

Public Sector Reforms in PNG

- One final and little-used explanation of the unreceptiveness of stakeholders in Papua New Guinea to reform measures concerns the organizational model which they use as a reference.
- It is a model of bureaucratic organizational structures and practices. This model has inherent dysfunctions such as an input orientation rather than a focus on results. Its colonial origins may also put it at odds with indigenous culture as Michael Somare observed before independence.
- But in Papua New Guinea the dysfunctionality has been greatly boosted by unplanned changes such as the politicization of appointments, the weak development of public accountability, the absence of evaluation, and low morale.

Public Sector Reforms in PNG

- The result is a severely deformed bureaucratic form of organization which bears little if any resemblance to the rationality of the Weberian ideal type.
- Its members are highly suspicious of change and anyway often lack the capacity to design and implement changes that would lead to performance improvement. The pursuit of political agendas has contributed to the bureaucracy's incremental decay rendering it inappropriate for the tasks it is supposed to perform.
- The quest for public sector reform will undoubtedly continue. In 2002 multilateral and bilateral agencies were pouring in money for this purpose and hopes were high.

Public Sector Reforms in PNG

- According to the ADB (2001), Papua New Guinea is 'moving to a performance based public sector'.
- This may prove to have been an optimistic assertion. Previous predictions of reform success have often fallen short of expectation. Some rethinking of policies is essential, as is the capacity to learn the lessons of earlier failures.
- The learning is not simply a matter for Papua New Guinean officials but also for the international financial agencies which have been and still are so heavily involved in promoting public sector reform.

Public Sector Reforms in PNG

- There is also much room for popular involvement, not simply as presenting unrealistic wish lists of projects but in sharing information, participating in planning and assuming some responsibility for accountability.
- Seeking good practice in Papua New Guinea and how to replicate it is another underutilized strategy, as is good research on management matters.
- A continuing problem is that we still know very little about how organizations work in Papua New Guinea.
- But above all else there will need to be changes in the politics of public sector management if reforms are to be successful and the ADB's promised 'performance based public sector' becomes a reality.

Post 2001 reforms: over view

- The post-1999 reforms have given rise to a plethora of ‘programs’ and ‘initiatives’, mostly designed to achieve what one might expect to be part of the normal day-to-day activities of departments, agencies and sub-national governments (but which clearly have not been).
- Inevitably perhaps, much of what is listed in the goals and guiding principles of these programs and initiatives consists of broad, uncontroversial statements of intention; nevertheless experience suggests that it is sometimes useful to spell out what might seem obvious, especially if in spelling out objectives and strategies one can provide a framework within which specific problems may be identified, addressed and monitored.
- As several people, including Prime Minister Somare, have observed, what has been lacking in public sector reform in Papua New Guinea in the past has been not so much sound policies as a commitment to implement them at all levels of government.

Post 2001 reforms: over view

- In the proliferation of new initiatives, some of them largely donor-driven, there is a danger that overall coordination becomes more difficult. It is clear that many public servants (and advisers), including some senior officers, have an incomplete knowledge of the range of new activities being introduced.
- This is exacerbated by the facts that key documents are often almost impossible to obtain, that increasing demands on the time of senior officers means that they frequently delegate or miss attendance at joint committee meetings, and that rapid turnover of staff (not to mention the retrenchment of a generation of middle managers with extensive field experience) shortens collective departmental memories.
- It is also clear that there is a significant knowledge gap between Waigani and the provincial capitals, district headquarters, and local-level government wards.

Why Implementation is a Challenge?

- “The essential constituents of any policy are **objectives and resources**. In most policies of interest, objectives are characteristically:
 - **multiple** (because we want many things, not just one),
 - **conflicting** (because we want different things),
 - **vague** (because that is how we can agree to proceed without having to agree also on exactly what to do).”

A Policy-Implementation Dichotomy?

Policy implementation follows the process of policy formulation. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983) describe policy implementation to include exercising particular policy decisions in a manner directed by the prescriptions of an administrator, law, or court guidance.

Step 1: Make / Formulate Policy

Step 2: Implement Policy....

- The traditional distinction between policy-making and implementation parallels the **politics-administration dichotomy**.

Is there an “Ideal Type” of Implementation?

- At one extreme we have the **ideal type** of the perfectly performing policy idea: it only requires execution, and the only problem it raises are those of control.
- At the other extreme, the policy ideal is only an **expression of basic principles and aspirations**, a matter for philosophical reflection and political debate.
- In between, where we live, is a set of more or less developed potentialities embedded in pieces of legislation, court decisions, and bureaucratic plans.”

Prior Experiences and Assumptions Matter...

- “Implementation begins neither with words nor deeds, but with **multiple dispositions** to act or to treat certain situations in certain ways.” Majone and Wildavsky
 - Disposition: Tendency for something to act in a certain manner under given circumstances
- Perception of effectiveness of implementation is likely to be predicated on an **actor’s initial evaluation** of the statute.

The Place of Politics in Implementation:

- **loyalists**
 - Complete supporters of what they think the directors want
- **deviants**
 - put their own spin on policy.
 - those who knowingly undermine or counteract the policy
 - those who are passive and indifferent and for whom inaction secures their stake against those seeking changes.
- “There are those who exploit a particular interpretation of policy goals as a way of attaining power.”

Policy Networks

- Implementers tend to be participants in **policy networks**, and “play a major role in interpreting policy directives.”
- **“Policy content shapes implementation”**
 - **Defines the arena** in which the process takes place
 - Defines the identity and role of the principal actors
 - Defines range of permissible tools for action
 - Supplies resources

Implementation as Evolution

- “Why is it reasonable to assume that the final results will be **genetically related**, however indirectly, to the original policy idea?”
- “When social security changes from insurance to income redistribution, the same name conveys very different realities.”

The Relevance of the Chain of Causality

- “The longer the chain of causality, the more numerous the reciprocal relationships among the links and the more complex implementation becomes.”
- “The study of implementation requires understanding that apparently simple sequences of events depends on **complex chains of reciprocal interactions**. Hence, each part of the chain must be built with the others in view.”

Questions Concerning Organizational Structure & Program of Delivery:

- How centralized is the agency that delivers the program?
- Is a top-down or bottom-up management approach being taken?
- How much do lower-level administrators participate in decisions about the program?
- How many agencies, groups, and levels of government [and other third parties] must be involved in implementing the program?”

The Role of the Statute:

- A statute “has the capacity to ‘**structure**’ the entire implementation process:
 - through its selection of implementing institutions;
 - through providing legal and financial resources to those institutions;
 - through biasing the probable policy orientations of agency officials; and
 - through regulating the opportunities for participation by nonagency actors in the implementation process.”

What accounts for the differential success of public policies in the implementation process?

A problem of organizational management
or
A conflict of interest (over values)

- ▶ Goal ambiguity
- ▶ Control over subordinates
- ▶ Communications between policy makers and subordinates (principal/agent issues)
- ▶ Technical incompetence
- ▶ Inappropriate agent (political) discretion

Part III: How to tackle the Imple. Challenges?

Implementation Regime Framework

- “An implementation regime ‘can be an arrangement among implementation participants that identifies the values to be served during the implementation process and provides an organizational framework to promote values...”
- “The primary task of implementation is to create a context that will **induce** the participants to cooperate in the presence of conflict of interest.”

Cooperation: is it the way forward?

- “The IRF suggests that over time, regimes tend to move along a predictable dynamic toward cooperation.”
- Stoker: “Cooperation is more likely when participants are engaged in an ongoing relationship that creates a record of constructive interaction and expectations for the future...”
- “When these conditions are absent, implementation regime participants may use such mechanisms as side payments, issue linkage, and norms of reciprocity in order to build trust and cooperation.”
- “The views of individual actors and their organizational frames of reference shape their interaction in the **implementation network or structure.**”
- Conflict is legitimate.

Each actor's relationship to a program may be characterized along three dimensions:

- What is the direction of his preference on the matter at issue? Is he for or against?
- What is the intensity of preference? Does he care a lot about it, or is he relatively indifferent?
- What resources can he bring to bear to affect the outcome? Is he weak or strong?

Reasons why participants **may agree with the substantive ends** of a proposal and **still oppose** (or merely fail to facilitate) the **means** for effectuating it:

- Direct incompatibility with other commitments or organizational goals.
- No direct incompatibility, but a preference for other programs.
- Simultaneous commitments to others projects.
- Dependence on others who lack a sense of urgency in the project.
- Differences of opinion on leadership and proper organizational roles.
- Legal and procedural differences.
- Agreement coupled with lack of power or resources.

Identifying the ground realities

- Administrators discover during implementation that a different kind of program would work better than the one envisioned in the legislation;
- Insufficient resources are committed to the program;
- Implementers don't have the know-how to make the policy work.
- Special interest groups block implementation via the courts, appeals, and procedural rules disputes;
- The (high) number of decision-points increases the likelihood of delay

Reasons for a **gap between promise & performance** in a policy:

- Much legislation passed at the national, state, and local levels is symbolic, it is usually a *promise* that something can be done about an intractable social problem that has lingered on the public agenda for years;
- Legislation is often not based on a sound program theory that correctly identifies the conditions that will convince the target groups to behave in the desired fashion;
- Socioeconomic and political conditions change so that the solution promised in the legislation may not be appropriate a few years later;

Why monitoring is important?

- “...the very **interrelatedness of policy areas** in any complex society enormously increases the monitoring responsibility of the protectors of any particular statute and thus the probability that the statute will gradually be undermined through subsequent tangential legislation.”
- **Opponents can generally intervene more actively over a longer period of time than proponents.**
- “It has long been noted that most regulatory agencies eventually recognize that survival in an unbalanced political environment necessitates some accommodation with the interests of target groups and thus less departure from the status quo than envisaged by the original statutory mandate.”

How to fix slippages?

- “While some **slippage** is almost inevitable (if for no other reason than legitimate disagreements about how general rules apply to specific cases), it is our contention that such slippage can be minimized if the **statute stipulates unambiguous objectives**;
- assigns implementation to sympathetic agencies who will give it high priority;
- minimizes the number of veto points and provides sufficient financial resources to conduct the technical analyses and process individual cases;
- and biases the decision-rules and access points in favor of statutory objectives.”

Timing of Starting the Imple. process

- “Goggin and his colleagues found, in certain policy areas, that states that ‘strategically delayed’ implementation—in order to seek clarification of a policy, raise more funds, ensure support of affected groups, and so on—often had better success in implementing a policy than did states which immediately implemented a policy.”
- The nature of what is at stake in processes of policy execution may be subject to fundamentally different perspectives that are shaped by institutional foundations, policy actors, ethical dilemmas, path-dependence, language, culture, symbolic politics, etc.

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What next?

- Evaluation of public policy